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Abstract This is my contribution to a symposium on my book Why Tolerate Religion?
(Princeton, 2013), in which I respond to essays by François Boucher (Montreal) and Cécile
Laborde (University College London), Frederick Schauer (Virginia), Corey Brettschneider
(Brown), and Peter Jones (Newcastle). I clarify and revise my view of the sense in which
some religious beliefs are ‘‘insulated from reasons and evidence’’ in response to the criticisms of Boucher and Laborde (2015), but take issue with other aspects of their critique. I
defend most of my original argument against utilitarian and egalitarian objections from,
respectively, Schauer and Brettschneider. I also discuss and defend the ‘‘No Exemptions’’
approach to conscientious objection to neutral laws of general applicability against a
variety of objections, arguing, in particular, that my view is probably not very different
from that of Jones.
Keywords
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I am grateful to the editors of this journal (especially Massimo Renzo) for organizing this
symposium and to the contributors for their intelligent and instructive essays on my book
Why Tolerate Religion? (hereafter WTR).1 I will start with the most skeptical of the four
essays, by François Boucher and Cécile Laborde (2015),2 then proceed to the
1
Brian Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013). I first broached the
basic ideas in a paper of the same name in Constitutional Commentary 25 (2008): 1–27, though I modified
the original analysis of religions for purposes of the book, as well as adding discussions of alternative
accounts of the moral foundations of religious liberty and about the relationship between principled toleration and religious establishment.
2

‘‘Why Tolerate Conscience?’’ Criminal Law and Philosophy. doi:10.1007/s11572-014-9325-2.

& Brian Leiter
bleiter@uchicago.edu
1

University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA
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complementary essays by Frederick Schauer and Corey Brettschneider, which press,
respectively, on the utilitarian and egalitarian considerations at work in my arguments; and
then conclude with some reactions to the insightful essay by Peter Jones on burdenshifting, especially in British law pertaining to ‘‘indirect discrimination.’’

1 Reply to Boucher and Laborde
Boucher and Laborde (2015) offer a philosophically serious and incisive critique; of those
skeptical about the arguments in the book, their objections have taught me the most. Unlike
some critics,3 they almost always have a firm handle on the actual dialectical structure of
the arguments and the philosophical issues at stake. More importantly, they identify a
crucial ambiguity in my claim that all religions include some beliefs that are ‘‘insulated
from reasons and evidence,’’ and have persuaded me that I erred in a claim I made on p. 35
of WTR. I am especially grateful for their identifying the ambiguity in my original presentation, and for the opportunity now to refine the view to meet their objection.
In WTR, I argued that religions are distinguished (for purposes of their moral claim on
toleration4) by three characteristics: religions make some categorical demands on their
adherents; some of the beliefs in every religion are insulated from reasons and evidence as
those are understood in the sciences and common sense (call this a ‘‘naturalistic’’ conception of reasons and evidence); and religions provide existential consolation, that is, they
help reconcile people to the terrible truths about the human situation, namely, loss, suffering and death. Boucher and Laborde usefully distinguish two senses in which some
religious beliefs might be ‘‘insulated from reasons and evidence.’’ In one sense, insulation
is a ‘‘subjective epistemic attitude’’ (Boucher and Laborde 2015), in the sense that it is the
believer who will not consider reasons and evidence, even if they might bear on the belief.
In another sense, however, it is the religious beliefs themselves that are insulated, because
(as Boucher and Laborde (2015) quote me saying in a related context) they ‘‘neither claim
support from empirical evidence nor purport[s] to be constrained by empirical evidence’’
(WTR, p. 47). Non-cognitive judgments, even when they look syntactically like expressions of beliefs, would be a paradigmatic instance.
Let us call the former sense of ‘‘insulation from beliefs and evidence’’ a case of Believer
Insulation and the latter Belief Insulation. My considered view, in fact, is that it is Believer
Insulation that is crucial to the second of the three characteristics of religion, though, of
course, in some cases Believer Insulation will not be a problem if the beliefs in question are
marked by Belief Insulation. Boucher and Laborde (2015) aptly note the textual evidence
3

Cf. the incompetent review by Susan Mendus in Political Theory 41 (2013): 766–769. Mendus, in the
space of only a few pages, mischaracterizes the argument of my colleague Martha Nussbaum’s book Liberty
of Conscience (failing to realize that Nussbaum agrees with me that religion is not special, that it is
conscience that is special), wastes time arguing that not all religious beliefs are insulated from reasons and
evidence (even though my claim was that only some beliefs in all religions are), and says that I ‘‘impl[y] that
religious believers are not only stupid, but willfully stupid’’ (769). She can cite no actual text in support of
that point, since it is quite inconsistent not only with reality, but with an abiding Nietzschean theme of my
book, namely, that false and unwarranted beliefs are essential conditions of human life (cf. WTR,
pp. 90–91). Her attempt to support this fabricated ‘‘implication’’ consists in claiming that I ‘‘denounc[e] much religious belief as ‘culpably false’ or even ‘perniciously false’’’ without noting that this was
offered only as a possible interpretation of an argument of Simon Blackburn’s, which I went on to reject.
None of these mistakes are repeated in any of the thoughtful critiques in this symposium.

4

I allow, of course, that for purposes of other kinds of inquiry, such as sociological ones, these may not be
the relevant features. See WTR, pp. 28–30.
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that Believer Insulation is what I intended, but they correctly identify a passage where I
endorse, wrongly I now see, the Belief Insulation reading. At p. 35 of WTR, I say,
incorrectly, that insulation should be understood ‘‘as a claim about the religious doctrine
rather than about the typical epistemic attitudes of beliefs.’’ In this context, I was concerned to address the following worry:
Obviously, fanatics will hold any set of beliefs regardless of the evidence, and we
often characterize fanatical adherence to a doctrine, pejoratively, as a kind of ‘‘religious’’ devotion to it. But a fanatical defender of the theory of gravity, for example,
who does not even worry about how evidence of the expansion of the universe
squares with his theory, would hardly show that we ought to characterize the theory
of gravity as a religious doctrine, insulated from reasons and evidence. (WTR, p. 35)
Here I mistakenly assumed that the only way to save the ‘‘theory of gravity’’ from being a
‘‘religion’’ (given my account) was to emphasize that the theory of gravity is not
characterized by Belief Insulation (e.g., it is not a non-cognitive, non-descriptive, nonreferential body of judgments). But now I see that the correct thing to say is that the theory
of gravity is not a religion because it does not make categorical demands on its adherents
and it offers no existential consolation. At the same time, as I noted in the original text, it is
perfectly apt to describe the fanatical adherent (even of the theory of gravity!) as exhibiting
‘‘religious’’ devotion precisely in the sense that he exemplifies Believer Insulation in his
embrace of the theory.5
With this clarification, most of their other worries about ‘‘insulation from reasons and
evidence’’ as a marker of some religious beliefs can be dismissed. For example, as Boucher
and Laborde (2015) note, it is possible (and plausible) to dismiss intellectualist traditions in
theology as involving Believer Insulation, as I do.6 Their most ambitious claim, however,
is that my attempt to explain why morality generally is not a ‘‘religion’’ on my account
(WTR, pp. 50–52) fails. Moral systems typically involve (like religion) categorical
demands, and some (like Kant’s) arguably involve existential consolation (that Kant’s view
5

The only other place in WTR that Boucher and Laborde (2015) point to as exemplifying a mistaken
endorsement of Belief Insulation is my discussion (pp. 48–49) of the idea that a ‘‘metaphysics of ultimate
reality’’ might be an additional characteristic of religious belief. I argue, instead, that it should be subsumed
under the insulation criterion. Of course, as Boucher and Laborde (2015) note, for some logical positivists,
metaphysical claims were marked by Belief Insulation. But one need not endorse that view to recognize that
many (not all) metaphysical claims are marked by Believer Insulation, i.e., believers hold to their metaphysics of ultimate reality regardless of whether it enjoys any support from naturalistic reasons and evidence. (In the most substantial and interesting of the unsympathetic reviews, Robert Adams complained
about my endorsement of ‘‘an empiricist epistemology that does not clearly allow more room for metaphysical belief than the Vienna Circle did.’’ Review of WTR, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
01.06.2013, http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/36599-why-tolerate-religion/. Adams, a leading figure in the revival of
metaphysics, and in the epistemology of religious belief, is correct in his diagnosis: unfashionably, I
suppose, I think the Vienna Circle had the broad outlines of the correct epistemology, though mostly for the
wrong reasons. We should embrace a naturalistic conception of reasons and evidence because of its success,
and we should treat as good evidence whatever successful sciences, natural or cognitive, produce. But given
that epistemology [but not the semantic doctrines of the Vienna Circle], it follows that the kinds of
metaphysical claims at issue could only be embraced by someone in the grips of Believer Insulation.)
To be sure, some of the metaphysical claims may be non-cognitive to the extent they are primarily
normative in character. I return to that issue in the text.

6

Contrary to what Boucher and Laborde (2015) appear to think, while all the classic proofs of the existence
of God abide by the ‘‘laws of logic,’’ and the laws of logic are certainly partly of a naturalistic conception of
reasons and evidence, it is equally clear that they all involve premises that have no standing in logic or in a
naturalistic epistemology; thus, these classical proofs are not cases of theistic belief based on the kinds of
reasons and evidence operative in common sense and the sciences.
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is essentially a religious view I do not take to be an objection to my account). But are
moralities insulated from a naturalistic conception of reasons and evidence? I argue that
this turns ultimately on what one thinks is the most plausible metaphysics, epistemology,
and semantics of morality. Even granting the important distinction between Believer and
Belief Insulation, the latter is still relevant in the case of morality for the simple reason that
I do not think we can meaningfully generalize about the subjective epistemic attitude of
Believers in morality: unlike Believers in religion, who hold at least some of their beliefs in
the sense captured by Believer Insulation,7 I do not know that there is any meaningful
generalization to be made about ordinary attitudes about moral beliefs. (Do most moral
believers, apart from those whose moral beliefs are explicitly religious, describe their
moral beliefs as grounded in ‘‘faith’’?) I suggest, therefore, that we ask about insulation of
morality from the standpoint of two broad families of metaethical views. On cognitivist
naturalist realist views, moral beliefs are not insulated at all from naturalistic standards of
reasons and evidence;8 on non-cognitivist views, they are insulated, but not because of
Believer Insulation, but because they are not the kinds of propositional attitudes that have
truth-values.
Boucher and Laborde (2015) offer a variety of objections to this approach. First, they
complain the options I present constitute a ‘‘false dichotomy’’, pointing to non-naturalist
realisms like G.E. Moore’s as an example of a third view. That Moore’s view is
implausible, for reasons P.F. Strawson identified several decades ago,9 goes unmentioned. I
am agnostic between the alternatives I present, but it is incorrect, as Boucher and Laborde
(2015) believe, that I am agnostic about all metaethical options: such a posture would be
philosophically irresponsible. Second, they note that religions typically involve moral
judgments as well (that is how they make categorical demands on their adherents, after all),
and thus my approach to moral judgments as either non-cognitive (and thus Belief Insulated) or naturalist realist (and thus not Belief or Believer Insulated) would apply also to
religious moral judgments.10 This is correct, but also irrelevant. For what is crucial is that
all religions involve non-moral judgments about the way the world is that cannot be
interpreted in non-cognitive terms: e.g., that Christ rose from the dead after his resurrection, that one or more supernatural beings exist, that everything that lives is the reincarnation of a prior living being, and so on. These claims are cognitive, and systematically
false or, at best, unwarranted. They are also distinctive of religion but not of moralities.
Third, and finally, they claim that some ethical outlooks provide existential consolation,
citing Thomas Nagel and Ronald Dworkin, and invoking, more vaguely, unnamed
‘‘philosophers since the Ancient period’’.11 Nagel’s and Dworkin’s views strike me as

7

Peter Jones, in his essay ‘‘Accommodating Religion and Shifting Burdens.’’ Criminal Law and Philosophy
(2015; doi:10.1007/s11572-014-9328-z) puts it aptly: ‘‘there is clearly more to religious belief than the
evidence obliges us to believe. If there were not, religion would not be a matter of faith.’’

8

Boucher and Laborde (2015) appear to doubt that Peter Railton’s kind of naturalistic moral realism is
really naturalistic, suggesting that counterfactual claims about one’s psychological states are immune to
empirical evidence. I have no idea why they think this, though perhaps it is because they think that
naturalists have reason to disregard the cognitive sciences.

9

P.F. Strawson, ‘‘Ethical Intuitionism.’’ Philosophy 24 (1949): 23–33.

10

I note that their account of non-cognitivist expressivism is not entirely satisfactory, but the details do not
matter for purposes of the issues here.
11
The strongest case could be made for the Stoics, but even in that case it is doubtful that Stoic imperatives
are categorical, and the Stoics certainly do not understand them to be insulated from naturalistic reasons and
evidence.
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dubious,12 but I am happy to allow13 that they think their views could provide existential
consolation—i.e., a way of making sense of death and suffering—even though how they do
so remains a bit opaque.14 Let us grant, too, that their views are also insulated from reasons
and evidence, understood naturalistically, and that their views involve categorical demands
on their adherents.15 It would follow that their views are essentially religious in character,
notwithstanding their lack of adherents (beyond a few academic philosophers and graduate
students). This does not strike me as worrisome since, as I said early on, ‘‘if the best
analysis of religion … requires us to forfeit some of our pretheoretical intuitions, that may
be the cost of clear thinking about religious toleration and its parameters’’ (WTR, p. 30).
My own pretheoretical intuitions, in any case, were that views like Dworkin’s had a strong
religious flavor, and Dworkin himself near the end of his life was happy to claim the label
‘‘religious’’ for his views—a rare moment, in my view, of self-reflective honesty in his
corpus. And I would be happy to concede that, if there were any adherents of the Church of
Dworkin and they claimed exemption from laws of general applicability, they would be as
entitled to legal solicitude as the adherents of the Catholic Church. The fact remains that
most ordinary moral views are not embedded within a systematic view that purports to
offer existential consolation and that most ordinary moral views admit of one of the two
metaethical interpretations I suggested.
Boucher and Laborde (2015) pursue a second line of critique that I find less instructive
than the penetrating questions they raise about insulation from reasons and evidence. In
WTR, I consider two moral bases for exemptions for religious claims of conscience: what I
call ‘‘principled toleration’’ (Chapter 1) and ‘‘appraisal respect’’ (Chapter 4). I argue that
religious conscience is not, contra Martha Nussbaum, a proper object of appraisal respect,
and so focus on principled toleration. Boucher and Laborde (2015) have two objections:
first, that principled toleration is an inadequate foundation for exemptions; and second, that
there are other possible moral foundations I do not consider.
On the first point, Boucher and Laborde (2015) primarily rely on appeals to authority.
They note, correctly of course, that Locke did not conceive of toleration as requiring
exemptions (I did not claim he did, needless to say). They invoke Michael Sandel, who has
a kind of ‘‘appraisal respect’’ view, the view I argue against in Chapter 4 and to which
Boucher and Laborde (2015) offer no rejoinder. And they make some startling and
12
Nagel, unsurprisingly, badly misunderstands Nietzsche, who does not believe existential consolation of
the kind religion aspired to is possible. See generally, my ‘‘The Truth is Terrible,’’ in Nietzsche on Morality
and the Affirmation of Life, ed. Daniel Came (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming). On the
implausibility of Dworkin’s views about the objectivity of value, see my ‘‘Objectivity, Morality, and
Adjudication,’’ reprinted in my Naturalizing Jurisprudence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
13
Indeed, I acknowledge that ‘‘philosophical reflection’’ could be a source of existential consolation (WTR,
p. 62).
14

Contrast Catholic existential consolation: death is not really death, just passage to another life, where all
those who survive the deceased will again be reunited with him.

15

How categorical the demands really are should be considered in light of Nagel’s extraordinary response
to the arguments of G.A. Cohen: ‘‘I have to admit that, although I am an adherent of the liberal conception of
[justice and equality], I don’t have an answer to Cohen’s charge of moral incoherence. It is hard to render
consistent the exemption of private choice from the motives that support redistributive public policies. I
could sign a standing banker’s order giving away everything I earn above the national average, for example,
and it wouldn’t kill me. I could even try to increase my income at the same time, knowing the excess would
go to people who needed it more than I did. I’m not about to do anything of the kind, but the equalityfriendly justifications I can think of for not doing so all strike me as rationalizations …’’ Nagel, ‘‘Getting
Personal: Why Don’t Egalitarians Give Away Their Own Money?’’ Times Literary Supplement (June 23,
2000), p. 6. This strongly suggests that the moral requirements of the liberal, egalitarian view that Nagel
endorses are more akin to advice than categorical requirements.
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somewhat mysterious claims about what Rawls and Mill ‘‘intended’’ by the arguments of
theirs that I invoke, without actually considering the dialectical structure of those arguments and their entailments. Their crucial claim, though, is that the case for exemptions ‘‘is
more demanding than toleration as it is usually understood’’. The only relevant question,
however, is whether the usual understanding of toleration as meaning that one group puts
up with the beliefs and practices of another group of which it disapproves (see WTR, p. 8,
invoking Bernard Williams as ‘‘authority’’) is apt for the case of exemptions from laws of
general applicability.16 It so obviously is that I am perplexed by Boucher and Laborde’s
resistance. Consider the example I use repeatedly in WTR: the state disapproves of children carrying weapons in schools, yet Sikhs demand an exemption from the law prohibiting weapons in schools because of a religious obligation that Sikh boys acquire at the
age of maturity to carry the Kirpan, a ceremonial dagger that, in many cases, is an actual
knife. The state, in other words, is asked to put up with a practice of which it otherwise
disapproves. Toleration is exactly what is demanded, and so it is reasonable to ask whether
principled reasons for toleration would single out only religious obligations of
conscience.17
On the second point—that there are alternatives to principled toleration—I agree in
general that such foundations are possible. Indeed, as I note in Chapter 5 when discussing
religious establishment (WTR, p. 116), ‘‘equality values’’ are clearly implicated there, and
so I confine my argument only to the question of whether religious or non-religious
establishment is compatible with principled toleration (I argue that both can be). Boucher
and Laborde (2015) do not, however, make the case for an alternative moral foundation for
exemptions; they assert only that in the ‘‘literature … exemptions are justified by appealing
to basic liberal ideals of freedom, equality and inclusion …’’. Of course, not all the
literature takes that approach (vide Peter Jones!), but more significantly, none of the
examples they briefly invoke explain why ‘‘freedom, equality, and inclusion’’ single out
only religious claims of conscience—a point Jones presses effectively in his contribution to
this symposium. Having failed to show that principled toleration does not apply quite
obviously to exemptions, and having failed to make the case that other normative foundations would explain why religious conscience demands special legal solicitude, Boucher
and Laborde (2015) are unpersuasive in their second line of critique.
I conclude with a brief comment on Boucher and Laborde’s final worry that I am guilty
of what they call ‘‘‘the status-quo neutrality’ fallacy’’ in my opposition to non-burdenshifting exemptions for all claims of conscience. I predicated my opposition to such
exemptions on what I called the ‘‘Rousseauian worry about exemptions,’’ namely that
sometimes they frustrate pursuit of the general welfare, and thus constitute ‘‘a morally
objectionable injury to the general welfare’’ (WTR, p. 99). Exemptions from schemes
requiring mandatory vaccination against many diseases are a familiar case in point: vaccination schemes only work if almost everyone is vaccinated, but those who seek
exemptions want to free-ride on the fact that most of their fellow citizens are vaccinated.
According to Boucher and Laborde (2015), the fallacy in question consists in ‘‘assum[ing]
that currently existing laws and institutional arrangements are already fair and constitute an
16
I note that Jones agrees with me on this score, and he makes a strong case that even ‘‘indirect discrimination’’ law cannot be subsumed under principles of equality or distributive justice.
17
In their note 46, Boucher and Laborde (2015) note the possibility that, as I believe, ‘‘toleration provides
the moral foundation of religious liberty,’’ but suggest instead that it is ‘‘more likely that religious liberty is
the moral foundation of toleration.’’ I find this perplexing, and it is not made clearer by the observation that,
in the Rawlsian Original Position, contracting parties care about ‘‘their freedom of conscience’’ (emphasis
added).
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appropriate baseline against which demands for exemptions can be evaluated from a moral
point of view’’. I assume nothing of the kind. My point pertains only to laws that actually
promote the general welfare; if existing laws do not promote the general welfare, then the
analysis in my book is irrelevant: the problem with such laws is not that they do not
provide exemptions, it is that they are bad laws, which should perhaps be disobeyed. I also
assume, though did not make explicit, that any compelling considerations of fairness would
be part of a defensible conception of the general welfare. I do not have a theory of the
general welfare, but, as in most matters of moral interest, we do not require a comprehensive theory to single out central cases18: for example, mandatory vaccination schemes
promote the general welfare; regressive taxation schemes do not. In any case, I am happy
to go on record that I think many of the laws of the U.S. and other complacent Western
democracies do not promote the general welfare, on any reasonable conception, and that, in
consequence, the question of conscientious exemptions from those laws is less morally
important than the question of whether they should be obeyed at all, by anyone.

2 Reply to Schauer
Frederick Schauer presses me on whether I have taken utilitarian arguments seriously
enough, and with a few qualifications, I agree with much that he says, so my response shall
be relatively brief.19 Schauer focuses in particular on my treatment of the possibility that
the existential consolation provided by religion might turn out to be a utility-maximizing
justification for distinctively religious claims of conscience, quoting me as follows:
[T]he existential consolation function of religion only generates a utilitarian rationale
for tolerating religion qua religion if we bite what I will call the ‘‘speculative
bullet’’—that is, only if we are willing to speculate that the existential consolation
functions of religion produce more utility than the harm produced by the conjunction
of categoricity and insulation from evidence; and only if we are willing to speculate
that the preceding net gain in utility would be greater than the alternative ways of
producing existential consolation without the conjunction of categoricity and insulation from evidence. (WTR, pp. 62–63)
I see no reason for biting the speculative bullet; the burden of Schauer’s complaint is to
suggest, in essence, that maybe we should bite that bullet, that, perhaps, ‘‘this empirical
question is [not] as speculative as Leiter supposes’’.
Schauer begins, however, on a misguided note by invoking Marx’s famous claim that
religion is the ‘‘opiate of the masses.’’ That plausible empirical claim does not show,
however, that religion is utility-maximizing, except on the crudest Benthamite view, in
which pleasant subjective feelings are all there is to utility. Marx himself certainly did not
understand the import of his claim that way: his point was that capitalism was so clearly
18

This is one reason moral and political philosophy is mostly irrelevant to practical life.

19

Frederick Schauer, (2015). ‘‘On the Utility of Religious Toleration.’’ Criminal Law and Philosophy.
doi:10.1007/s11572-014-9317-2. Schauer begins his essay by taking issue with the framing of my question
as one about religious toleration, though, as I noted in reply to Boucher and Laborde (2015), it is quite
natural to frame the question in these terms: if Sikhs ask for the law to permit their boys to carry knives in
school, what they are asking for is precisely toleration of a practice of which the state disapproves, and they
are doing so on the ground that the practice is religiously motivated. It is, of course, true that my argument
supports religious toleration, as Schauer notes, but that is because I endorse the utilitarian and deontological
reasons supporting liberty of conscience, not toleration of religion qua religion.
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harming the well-being of the vast majority, that only a narcotic stupor made it possible for
them to carry on. If the only choices were between a narcotic stupor and suffering, then a
Benthamite would have a reason to prefer the latter. But those are not our only choices, and
the Benthamite view is, in any case, implausible.20
That issue aside, I agree with Schauer that the facts about the world could turn out to be
such that there would be a utilitarian rationale for thinking religion special compared to
other matters of conscience. But I do not see that Schauer adduces any empirical evidence
that would tell us to bite the speculative bullet in our world. I think there were probably
times in the history of humanity when the speculative utilitarian case would have been
clearer, but in the last two hundred years, when identity and conscience are so powerfully
shaped by political ideology, nationalism, cultural chauvinism, and other forces, it seems
speculative, indeed, to suggest that religion is uniquely utility-maximizing for most people,
at least in the liberal democracies which are my focus.21

3 Reply to Brettschneider
Brettschneider claims that my arguments for principled toleration involve egalitarian
commitments more robust than I allow—arguments that are incompatible, for example,
with my claim that state establishment of religion or non-religion could be compatible with
principled toleration.22 Brettschneider presses me towards a view closer to his own,23
according to which the state can promote the viewpoint that free and equal citizenship is a
fundamental value, but no other.
I find myself unpersuaded, and suspect that Brettschneider’s argument trades on
ambiguities about the idea of ‘‘equality.’’ Brettschneider correctly observes that there is an
egalitarian element to both the Rawlsian argument for justice as fairness, and the Millian
utilitarian argument but, in both cases, it seems to me to be of the relatively thin kind that is
shared by all the major post-Enlightenment thinkers except Nietzsche24: namely, that each
person has equal moral standing, however that is to be understood. Kant, Bentham, Marx
all accept this, though with different accounts of the relevant benchmark of equality
(crudely: rational personhood for Kant, sentience for Bentham, human needs for Marx);
something similar can be said of Mill and Rawls. But it does not follow from this thin
egalitarian ideal that the ‘‘distinction between appraisal and recognition respect should be
recast to rest on a notion of equal respect, as should the principle of toleration itself’’.
20
There is a further complication, which is that, as Nietzsche argued in On the Genealogy of Morality,
religion tends to make the suffering worse off in new ways, by instilling in them crippling guilt and selfloathing.
21
Schauer thinks, mistakenly, that my focus on ‘‘principled toleration’’ rules out the kinds of utilitarian
considerations he wants to press (see Section VII). By principled toleration, I mean only toleration grounded
on moral considerations, whether utilitarian or deontological. That is quite compatible with, as Schauer puts
it, taking account of the ‘‘irrational features of the actual world’’ in performing the utilitarian calculus.
Indeed, since a recurring theme in my book is that religion is hardly unique in involving false and
unwarranted beliefs, I would scarcely be in a position to complain if the utilitarian took that into account!
But, for the reasons given in the text, I still do not see that this concession justifies biting the speculative
bullet.
22
Corey Brettschneider, ‘‘Equality as a Basis for Religion Toleration: A Response to Leiter,’’ Criminal Law
and Philosophy (2015).
23

See Corey Brettschneider, When the States Speaks, What Should It Say? (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2012).

24

See my Nietzsche on Morality, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2015), pp. 241–243.
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Brettschneider says that on his view ‘‘religious belief is not a proper object of appraisal
respect because that form of respect elevates religious belief as being inherently superior to
secular beliefs’’. That is a possible reason for objecting to making religion an object of
appraisal respect, but it is clearly not my reason: as I argue in Chapter IV, the reason that
religious toleration cannot be grounded in appraisal respect is that religion—marked as it is
by the conjunction of categorical demands, Believer Insulation, and existential consolation—is not something to be highly appraised in virtue of these. Comparative judgments
about inequality play no role in my argument.
Should they? Brettschneider does not show that the thin ideal of equality at work in the
Rawlsian and Millian arguments so commits me. His only other argument is that
‘‘[e]mphasizing the centrality of equality to toleration would help to address dilemmas in
the law of religious freedom’’ that are ‘‘unresolved’’ on my view. Brettschneider points to
Wisconsin v. Yoder,25 a famous American case I do not discuss in WTR. In Yoder, the U.S.
Supreme Court granted Amish parents an exemption from the requirement that their
children attend school past the eighth grade. Surprisingly, Brettschneider suggests initially
that this is not a burden-shifting exemption, even though it harms the Amish children. He
soon acknowledges, correctly, that the latter might be my view, but says ‘‘[t]he best
interpretation of this harm is that denying them [the children] education would leave them
unable to participate as equals in society’’, that is, as ‘‘free and equal citizens’’ to use
Brettschneider’s preferred phrase. This strikes me as implausible: surely the harm to the
children is that they will not have the knowledge or skills that will allow them to live lives
outside the Amish community into which fate thrust them, and thus are condemned by
birth to one and only one possible type of life. The harm is to their well-being; they would
not be better off if everyone else were similarly condemned, and so equality has nothing to
do with it. It is true that one of the harms is that they won’t be well-equipped to participate
in the political processes of a democratic polity, but that is surely not as important as the
fact that deprivation of education will insure that their family lives, their professional lives,
their private intellectual lives, their social lives will be forever sealed by an accident of
birth—and that, for some or many of these Amish children, their well-being will, in
consequence, be diminished.
Brettschneider agrees with me that ‘‘any state must inevitably express some viewpoint’’,
but he then argues that only one viewpoint is permissible: namely, the promotion of the
value of free and equal citizenship, especially against hate speech. I think that is certainly
one viewpoint a state might choose to promote which would be compatible with principled
toleration. But I also think, contrary to what Brettschneider says, that a state may endorse,
as France does, the secular character of the public sphere as well.26 Indeed, the French do
so on equality grounds, namely, that in the public sphere everyone should interact as equal
citizens without regard to their sectarian identities. This illustrates, I fear, how empty the
ideal of ‘‘free and equal citizenship’’ really is, absent further substantive normative claims.
Freedom and equality seem like normative ideals worth endorsing, by individuals and by
the state, but everything turns on their content: Marxists deny (correctly, in my view) that
citizens can be free and equal in a capitalist society; libertarians would disagree. In the end,
all states, even liberal ones, endorse viewpoints that go far beyond platitudes about free and
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406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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Brettschneider confuses, I fear, my conclusion that the French ban on conspicuous religious symbols in
the public schools was a case of impermissible intolerance (see WTR, pp. 114–115) with the claim that the
French state cannot endorse secularism.

123

556

Crim Law and Philos (2016) 10:547–558

equal citizenship. We should ask whether they have endorsed worthy viewpoints, not
whether they respect a generic equality.
Whether a state should endorse secularism is a question on which I am agnostic, but I
am explicit that doing so is compatible with principled toleration (WTR, pp. 120–121).
Ideally, a state should endorse views that are proper objects of appraisal respect; even if
religion per se is not, particular religious views could be (WTR, p. 174 n. 48). While it is
true that I agree with Brettschneider that ‘‘the state must not accord appraisal respect to
religion’’, it is not because of the inequality that would involve between religion and
‘‘secular views,’’ but because religion does not warrant high appraisal. Brettschneider
offers no argument to the contrary.

4 Reply to Jones
I suspect I have learned more from Jones’s fine essay than he has probably learned from
my book, and I am grateful for his instruction on the many interesting issues he takes up:
the law of indirect discrimination in Britain, the inadequacy of equality and distributive
justice rationales for the latter, and why people should bear the costs of their beliefs. Apart
from commending Jones’s essay to anyone interested in the topic of this symposium, I will
confine my remarks to one small point of disagreement or, perhaps, simple
misunderstanding.
Jones agrees with me in locating the foundation of religious liberty in a broader liberty
of conscience; he then writes:
Liberty of conscience is most unequivocally at stake when, in the absence of
accommodation, we would compel people to act contrary to their consciences, as we
would if, for example, we required the pacifist to fight in a war, or the orthodox Jew
to testify in court on a Saturday, or the Catholic priest to divulge the confidences of
his confessional. A more institutional instance of liberty of conscience is the
exemption granted to ‘‘organised religions’’ by British discrimination law …
allowing them to discriminate in employment, not merely on grounds of religion but
also on grounds of gender, sexual orientation, transsexuality and marital status,
provided that such discrimination is required by their doctrines or to avoid conflict
with the strongly held convictions of a significant number of their adherents [citation
omitted] ….
Even in these sorts of case, Leiter vetoes exemptions if they burden-shift. If we
exempt conscientious objectors from mandatory military service, we shift the burden
of their service onto others who does not conscientiously object. Hence Leiter would
not exempt even the conscientious objector (WTR, pp. 99–100, 162).
I baulk at the severity of Leiter’s stance precisely because, in compelling the objector
to do what he believes to be wrong, we violate his liberty of conscience. Giving
significant value to liberty of conscience seems inconsistent with dismissing it unless
it is entirely without cost for society. That is not to say that liberty of conscience
should be absolute … [European law] subjects the freedom to manifest religion or
belief to ‘such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedom of others’ [citation omitted].
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I would also balk at the apparent severity, and so I welcome the opportunity to clarify my
view and explain why it is probably not very different from where Jones ends up.
Let us start with exemptions from anti-discrimination law; U.S. law recognizes a similar
exemption, under the heading of the ‘‘ministerial exemption,’’ which permits religious
organizations to appoint ‘‘ministers’’ by almost any discriminatory criteria they choose.27
One should note, of course, that in British law, discrimination on the basis of race is not
among the contemplated exemptions, a telling omission: the liberty of individual conscience as manifest in a religious institution must still yield before anti-discrimination
norms that are sufficiently important. I predict a time will come when at least the genderbased discrimination in certain religions currently countenanced by the law in Britain and
the U.S. will come to seem similarly abhorrent. Predictions about moral sensibilities aside,
it is my view that anti-discrimination norms promote the general welfare, and that
exemptions from them shift burdens in objectionable ways. There may still be reasons for
democratic societies to permit such circumscribed exemptions—not reasons of principled
toleration to be sure. The burdens shifted by something like a ministerial exception are
small, and they fall primarily on adherents of the religion in question—adherents who, as
Jones himself plausibly argues, must bear the costs of their beliefs. And while the burdens
shifted are small, the cost of denying exemptions might be very great, so much so that
considerations of Hobbesian compromise come into play. Although I distinguished
Hobbesian compromise—putting up with disfavored beliefs and practices because the cost
of suppressing them is too great—from principled toleration in Chapter 1 of WTR, I do not
deny that Hobbesian compromise is important and, sometimes, the best we can aspire
towards. Principled toleration is always preferable for the tolerated group, to be sure, since
those who put up with practices of which they disapprove for reasons only of Hobbesian
compromise will act differently if they think they can suppress the practice without
intolerable costs. But real politics demands recognition of the value of Hobbesian compromise, and that may be where Western democracies are now with respect to discrimination based on gender (among other characteristics) by different religions.
What about compulsory military service? Again, as I emphasized in reply to Boucher
and Laborde (2015), there is the threshold question of whether the law in question actually
promotes the general welfare. There are times and places where compulsory military
service is undoubtedly essential to the general welfare; there are many other times and
places where it is not. When the U.S. invaded South Vietnam in 1962 or the Dominican
Republic in 1965, it used its military power for unjust purposes; military conscription for
purposes like these could not be justified. The moral issue in such cases is not exemptions,
but the fact of unjustified conscription itself. By contrast, some countries probably can
justify military conscription in terms of the general welfare, precisely because such conscription is genuinely necessary for defense of the nation in which its citizens lead their
lives. In such cases, exemptions are intolerably burden-shifting, in my view, and the only
reasons to countenance them will pertain to Hobbesian considerations, not ones of principled toleration.
I am skeptical that any of this marks a real disagreement with Jones, who endorses the
European approach, which acknowledges that liberty of conscience is not absolute, indeed,
that it is subject to limitation by laws that are ‘‘necessary in a democratic society in the
interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the
protection of the rights and freedom of other.’’ If anything, this limitation on liberty of
conscience strikes me as excessive, since it countenances the cognitively empty category
27

See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012).
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of ‘‘morals’’ as a reason for limiting liberty of conscience. Purportedly ‘‘moral’’ considerations that have nothing to do with maximizing the well-being of other persons should be
off-limits as a basis for limiting liberty of conscience, on my view. But since Jones
endorses this European approach, he is likely to agree with my own approach, sketched
above, to some of the difficult cases he identifies.
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